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addressing this theoretical tension mostly supports the former hypothesis; we suggest that thisThere are two competing hypotheses explaining how innovativeness inﬂuences the survival of
startups: On the one hand, innovativeness is argued to foster survival-enhancing attributes
(e.g., market power and cost efﬁciency) and capabilities (e.g., absorptive capacity). On the other
hand, an innovative startup faces (and bears the associated risks of) liabilities of newness and
smallness that exceed those of its non-innovative counterparts. The available empirical literature
ﬁnding is, in part, driven by the common practice of employing an ex post measure that already
embodies a degree of success in innovativeness. We use an ex ante measure and ﬁnd that a
startup's innovativeness is negatively associated with its subsequent survival. We also ﬁnd that
entrepreneurs' greater appetite for risk magniﬁes this negative association. These ﬁndings imply
that pursuing innovations is not necessarily associated with survival during the early stages of
ﬁrm development and entails a more complicated start-up process.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Keywords:
Entrepreneurship
Innovativeness
Startups
Survival1. Executive summary
The link between innovativeness and ﬁrm survival has been studied extensively in previous research. Theoretical considerations
suggest that innovativeness might have either a positive or a negative effect on ﬁrms' survival prospects, whereas the previous
empirical literature mostly suggests that the association is positive.
However, we ﬁnd a negative association between innovativeness and subsequent ﬁrm survival, whichwe attribute to two factors.
First, we employ an ex ante measure that mirrors the inherent uncertainty of innovativeness and mixes successful and unsuccessful
innovative efforts. Second, we study the association between innovativeness and survival using data on startups, i.e., ﬁrms that are in
the early stages of their development.
We suggest that future analyses of the innovativeness–survival nexus pay careful attention to two types of survivorship biases.
First, there is a survivorship bias of ideas, when the empirical measures of innovativeness refer to ex post indicators that tend to
capture successful innovations and innovators. For example, although patents and other intermediate innovation outcomes do not
guarantee success in the marketplace, they do indicate a level of success with prior innovative effort. Second, there is a survivorship
bias forﬁrms,when the study sample consists of incumbentﬁrms that are a selected subset ofﬁrms that originally entered themarket.
In such a selected sample, there is a risk that a spurious positive correlation will be found between innovativeness and survival.
Our data refer to two cohorts of 1165 Finnish startups surveyed shortly after their entry into themarket. The data allow us tomea-
sure innovativeness by the startups' ex ante plans to employ innovations and to actively pursue innovations, whichmay (ormay not)
lead to desired outcomes., mika.pajarinen@etla.ﬁ (M. Pajarinen), petri.rouvinen@etla.ﬁ (P. Rouvinen).
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pects. Our baseline estimations suggest that the survival rate for innovative startups is approximately 6–7 percentage points lower
than that of non-innovators. This negative association is consistent with the view that pursuing innovations appears to lead to a
more complicated start-up process that may be disproportionately hindered by the liability of newness. We also ﬁnd that the inter-
action of innovativeness and entrepreneurs' greater appetite for risk further reduces the prospects for survival, which is consistent
with a trait–task dependency.
Our ﬁndings have important practical implications. On the one hand, they suggest that entrepreneurs should not regard innova-
tiveness as a form of insurance against failure in the startup phase. On the other hand, our analysis casts doubt on the policy premise
that innovating ventures should be supported because they are more likely than other startups to survive and create stable jobs. Of
course, our ﬁndings by themselves do not undermine other policy reasons to support innovation in new ventures.
2. Introduction
Does innovativeness have a positive or negative effect on ﬁrms' survival prospects? We study these two competing per-
spectives empirically by focusing on the innovativeness–survival link during the early stages of ﬁrm development. Our moti-
vation to examine the innovativeness–survival link in this particular context is that the theoretical literature suggests that the
effect can be either positive or negative, whereas the empirical literature—with a few notable exceptions—suggests a positive
relation.
A number of theoretical arguments suggest a positive link between innovativeness and subsequent survival: In addition tomaking
entry possible, innovativeness enhances ﬁrms' market power (Schumpeter, 1934), improve their ability to escape competition
(Porter, 1980), reduce their production costs (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b), improve dynamic capabilities (Teece et al.,
1997), and lead to enhanced absorptive capacity (Zahra and George, 2002). However, another set of theoretical arguments suggest
that the link may also be negative: Pursuing innovations leads to riskier, more complicated, and less linear start-up processes
(Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009) and (potentially) to more skewed returns (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). An innovative startup
may face a greater liability of novelty than its non-innovative counterparts (see, e.g., Amason et al., 2006). Other scholars argue
that such ﬁrms suffer from having few collateralizable assets and long and uncertain payback times (Brown et al., 2012; Minetti,
2011). Therefore, innovative startups have more limited access to external ﬁnancing, which leads to a greater likelihood of failure
(Berger and Udell, 2006). Moreover, entrepreneurs who believe that they are exceptionally innovative may have a particular
exit strategy inmind (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2015) andmay, as a result, seek to increase the ﬁrm's risk proﬁle to achieve the desired exit.
The prevailing view in the empirical literature appears to be that there is a positive association between the innovativeness of ﬁrms
and their subsequent survival (Arrighetti and Vivarelli, 1999; Audretsch, 1995; Calvo, 2006; Ceﬁs andMarsili, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2012;
Colombelli et al., 2013; Helmers and Rogers, 2010; Sarkar et al., 2006;Wagner and Cockburn, 2010). Nevertheless, there is emerging
empirical evidence suggesting that these results may be context-dependent and not necessarily applicable to younger ﬁrms (Boyer
and Blazy, 2013; see also Cader and Leatherman, 2011; Reid and Smith, 2000).
We contribute to this emerging empirical literature and argue that the widely documented positive association between innova-
tiveness and survival does not necessarily apply to the youngest ﬁrms, particularly after two interrelated but separate selection biases
are accounted for. First, there is a survivorship bias of ideas. As Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) note, the empirical measures of innovative-
ness are frequently ex post indicators that tend to capture successful innovations and innovators (Artz et al., 2010; Mairesse and
Mohnen, 2002; Pandit et al., 2011; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Although patents, for example, in no way guarantee success in
the market place, they do indicate a certain level of success regarding innovativeness. Because such success rarely decreases proﬁts,
innovative ﬁrms ﬂagged by ex post indicators are more likely to survive than otherwise similar but not (yet) successfully innovating
ﬁrms. In the context of patents, an unsuccessful innovation might be represented by a rejected application; a preferred ex ante
indicator of innovativeness would capture both patent approvals and rejections, in addition to situations in which the innovator
did not seek patent protection. Second, there is a survivorship bias with respect to ﬁrms that have successfully traded in the market-
place as independent businesses (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002; Kannebley et al., 2010). In other words, incumbent businesses are a
selected subset of ﬁrms that originally entered the market (Cader and Leatherman, 2011). As we explain later, a typical survival re-
gression may yield a spurious positive correlation between early-stage innovativeness and survival, if this type of selected sample
is employed.
This paper examines whether innovativeness enhances or reduces startups' survival prospects. By considering these two compet-
ing perspectives, we shed new light on the theoretical tension discussed above in the speciﬁc context of youngﬁrms. Our contribution
to the empirical literature is, ﬁrst of all, that we address the two interrelated selection biases simultaneously.Wemeasure innovative-
ness by ﬁrms' ex ante plans to employ new-to-the-market processes or products/services in the next three years and by ﬁrms' active
engagement in such innovativeness. Compared with most of the ﬁrm-level measures used in the prior empirical literature, this
measure better mirrors the uncertainty that characterizes (only potentially successful) innovativeness of a ﬁrm from an ex ante
perspective. In this regard, we also differ from those prior papers that focus on the effects of the overall innovativeness of the industry
(the technological environment) on ﬁrm survival. Moreover, our estimating sample consists of startups surveyed in the ﬁrst few
months after entering the market, which considerably reduces the survivorship bias of ﬁrms. We evaluate how innovativeness is
associated with ﬁrm survival in this empirical setting. Second, we take a step further by empirically studying how the relation
between innovativeness and ﬁrm survival is moderated by the risk appetite of the startups' founder-entrepreneurs. Our motivation
to do so is that this interaction is one of themost salient trait–task dependencies that we can imagine in light of the received literature
(Rauch and Frese, 2007; see also Caggese, 2012; Cucculelli and Ermini, 2013; Kessler et al., 2012): more risk-tolerant entrepreneurs
566 A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581are more likely to pursue innovations that are risky ex ante. The consequences of this extra risk clearly depend on the nature of the
innovativeness–survival link in the ﬁrst place.
We wish to note at the outset that our study does not explicitly focus on determining the private or social returns generated by
innovative startups. This stancemeans that ourﬁndings do not rule out the possibility that either the expected private or social returns
are greater for those startups that pursue innovativeness than for those that adopt more imitative business models.3. Previous empirical literature
The prevailing view in the empirical literature appears to be that there is a positive association between innovativeness and ﬁrm
performance. For example, Rosenbusch et al. (2011) perform a detailed meta-analysis of the innovation–performance relationship
among small andmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs) andﬁnd that innovation is positively associatedwith SMEs' performance. Echoing
this ﬁnding, Song et al. (2008) report that a positive innovativeness–performance link is found in over two-thirds of the empirical
studies they review. Both of thesemeta-analyses also ﬁnd that the resultsmay be context-dependent and heterogeneous; in addition,
when measures of innovation inputs (as opposed to ex post outcomes) are used in the analysis, the empirical association between
ﬁrms' innovativeness and their performance becomes weaker.
Turningmore speciﬁcally to the relationship between innovativeness andﬁrm survival, Table 1 summarizes a large grouping of the
available empirical analyses. As shown in the upper part of Table 1, a number of prior studies report a positive association. In a series of
recent papers, Ceﬁs and Marsili (2005, 2006, 2011, 2012) use Dutch Community Innovation Survey data to study the link between
innovativeness and survival. In general, these authors ﬁnd that success in nurturing product or process innovations is positively
correlated with established ﬁrms' subsequent business survival. Colombelli et al. (2013) employ a sample of French manufacturing
ﬁrms to study how aspects of ﬁrms' patent stocks affect survival. They ﬁnd that innovation enhances survival prospects. Esteve-
Perez and Manez-Castillejo (2008) use a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms to test a set of hypotheses derived
from the resource-based theory of the ﬁrm; these authors ﬁnd that development of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets via R&D improves survival
prospects. Helmers and Rogers (2010) study a cohort of UK-based limited liability companies established in 2001 and ﬁnd that
owning intellectual property is positively associated with survival. Wagner and Cockburn (2010) study the survival prospects of
Internet companies after an initial public offering on the NASDAQ and ﬁnd that patenting is positively associated with ﬁrm survival.
Coad and Guenther (2013) study German machine tool manufacturers in the post-war era and examine degrees of diversiﬁcation
among such manufacturers, which is related to product innovation. Among other things, they ﬁnd that survival prospects are
enhanced by innovativeness, “if not undertaken too hastily” (p. 634).Table 1
Previous empirical research.
Article Sample Innovation measure Link to
survival?
Comment
Ceﬁs and Marsili (2005) Sample of mostly established Dutch
manufacturing ﬁrms
CIS: Successful innovativeness;
innovation types
Positive Particularly for
process innovation
Ceﬁs and Marsili (2006) Sample of mostly established Dutch
manufacturing ﬁrms
CIS: Introduction of either process or
product innovation(s)
Positive
Ceﬁs and Marsili (2012) Sample of mostly established Dutch
manufacturing ﬁrms
CIS: Successful innovativeness;
innovation types
Positive
Coad and Guenther (2013) Population of post-war German
machine tool manufacturers
Product portfolios compiled from trade
journals
Positive
Colombelli et al. (2013) Sample of established French
manufacturing ﬁrms
Measures based on EPO patent ﬁlings Positive
Helmers and Rogers (2010) Cohort of UK limited liability companies
established in 2001
EPO and UK patents and trademarks Positive
Wagner and Cockburn (2010) Sample of Internet-related ﬁrms that
made an IPO in NASDAQ
USPTO ﬁlings for business method and
other patents
Positive
Esteve-Perez and
Manez-Castillejo (2008)
Sample of established Spanish
manufacturing ﬁrms
R&D expenditure Positive Evidence of
heterogeneity
Ceﬁs and Marsili (2011) Sample of mostly established Dutch
manufacturing ﬁrms
CIS: Introductions of process and product
innovations
Positive,
Negative
Negative in
high-tech ind.
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) Cohort of US manufacturing
establishments
Trade journal announcements
(industry-level)
Negative Note: Industry-level
measure
Cader and Leatherman (2011) Sample of US establishments with over
100 employees
Industrial classiﬁcation
(SIC, industry-level)
Negative Note: Industry-level
measure
Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) Large sample of Australian old and new
businesses
Measures based on patent, trademark,
and design applic./grants
Positive/
Negative
Negative, when radical
innovation used
Boyer and Blazy (2013) Cohort of French startups initially
having under 10 employees
Innovativeness Negative
Notes: CIS=Eurostat's Community Innovation Survey. USPTO: TheUnited States Patent and TrademarkOfﬁce. EPO=European Patent Ofﬁce. SIC=Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (US).
567A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581The lower part of Table 1 shows that a number of qualiﬁcations are warranted: the general positive association appears to be
at least somewhat context-dependent (it is conditioned on the level and type of innovation measure) and may not apply to all
ﬁrms.
First, there is some evidence of heterogeneity in the innovativeness–survival link, both across ﬁrms (e.g., Esteve-Perez andManez-
Castillejo, 2008) and across industries (e.g., Ceﬁs andMarsili, 2011; see also Bayus and Agarwal, 2007). Second, there are studies that
use industry-level measures of innovativeness or the technological environment and ﬁnd a negative association between thesemea-
sures and ﬁrm survival. For example, in their seminal paper, Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) study over 12,000 US manufacturing
establishments entering themarketplace in 1976 and ﬁnd that operating in a highly innovative environment hurts survival prospects
(see also Audretsch, 1991). More recently, Cader and Leatherman (2011) have analyzed the survival of new US establishments enter-
ing themarketplace from 1990 to 1998. Echoing Audretsch andMahmood (1995), they ﬁnd that new establishments are less likely to
survive in technology-intensive industries.
Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) study ﬁrm survival using a large panel of Australian ﬁrms. To differentiate between legal and market
uncertainty and between incremental and radical innovations, these authors use both patent and trademark applications and grants
to derive measures of ﬂows and stocks of innovativeness. Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) ﬁnd that past success in radical innovation—as
captured by the stock of granted patents—enhances survival prospects; however, these authors also ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely
to fail immediately after investing in radical innovation, as measured by submitted patent applications. These ﬁndings point to a
selection problem because submitted patent applications are less likely to indicate success regarding innovativeness and are thus
less likely to refer to ex post outcomes. The authors' analysis does not, however, explicitly address the survivorship bias of ﬁrms
because their data consist mostly of incumbent ﬁrms.
In summary, the prior empirical literature suggests a positive association between innovativeness and ﬁrm survival, with some
qualiﬁcations. In many cases, the measures of innovativeness employed embody some degree of (ﬁrm-level) success and thus
refer, at least in part, to ex post outcomes. Furthermore, the data sets previously employed frequently consist of ﬁrms that have
previously had some success in the marketplace.
As amatter of fact, themost recent studies using data on youngﬁrms suggest a reason to reassesswhether the association between
innovativeness and ﬁrm survival is indeed positive in the early stages of ﬁrm development. Boyer and Blazy (2013) study the survival
determinants of innovative and non-innovative micro-enterprises established in France in 1998. These authors explore a variety of
survival determinants, but a key ﬁnding of their study—particularly from our perspective—is that the likelihood of survival of innova-
tive enterprises is 10% lower than that of non-innovators. However, Boyer and Blazy (2013) do not link their ﬁndings to the two
selection biases or, e.g., to the liabilities of newness and smallness that we emphasize. Moreover, these authors do not condition
their analysis on the size of the startup at the time of market entry, which is potentially problematic because it is well-established
that size at entry is an important predictor of subsequent survival (e.g., Reid, 1995). Not controlling for it in the survival model
may lead to a negative bias in the coefﬁcient for the innovativeness measure, particular if entry size is negatively correlated with
the likelihood of pursuing innovations in the startup phase.
4. Theory and hypotheses
The available literature sets forth a number of theoretical arguments explaining why the relation between SMEs' innovativeness
and their subsequent performance, including longer-term survival, might be either positive or negative.
The arguments pointing to a positive innovativeness–performance relation include, but are not limited to, the following: Innova-
tiveness (i) enhances SMEs' market power (at least temporarily; Schumpeter, 1934) and their ability to escape competition (Nelson
and Winter, 1982; Porter, 1980); (ii) reduces the costs of production (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b; Nelson andWinter, 1982);
(iii) creates dynamic capabilities for the SMEs (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997); and (iv) improves their absorptive
capacity (Zahra and George, 2002).
There are, however, a number of mechanisms that may moderate the association between innovativeness and ﬁrm perfor-
mance (many of these are carefully described and reviewed by Rosenbusch et al., 2011) and even reverse its sign to make it neg-
ative. In the following, we focus on the mechanisms that are particularly salient and relevant for understanding the association
between innovativeness and startup survival: (1) the stage of ﬁrm development, and (2) attitudes toward risk (i.e., entrepreneurial
risk-taking).
4.1. Stage of ﬁrm development
The process of new venture creation is at the core of entrepreneurship research (Casson, 2005; Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009;
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). A large segment of this literature builds on the notion that the venture creation process is based on a
novel business idea (such as an innovative product) that a newventure explores and experimentswith and thatmay eventually allow
the new venture to outperform its competitors (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012; Schumpeter, 1934).
Younger ﬁrms may beneﬁt more from innovativeness because they have less rigid routines (e.g., Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990;
Freeman et al., 1983), can adapt more quickly to changes in their operating environment (Klepper and Simons, 1997) and are more
likely to be entrepreneurially alert and oriented (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). They are also more open to the possibilities that techno-
logically driven discontinuities can create (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Based on these arguments,
Rosenbusch et al. (2011) hypothesize that the positive association between innovativeness and small business performance is
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association may also be questioned on theoretical grounds.
4.1.1. Liabilities: newness, smallness, and novelty
Stinchcombe (1965) suggests that an entrant organization suffers from a liability of newness, which manifests itself in lower
survival probability compared with a similar incumbent organization. He attributes this liability to having both less experience in
cooperating with other organizations and less legitimacy in the eyes of potential ﬁnanciers and other stakeholders (see also Baum
and Oliver, 1996). A related but distinct argument is the liability of smallness (Freeman et al., 1983), which refers to size-driven
problems that are related to being able to attract human capital (e.g., recruiting and retaining skilled and educated employees), raising
sufﬁcient external ﬁnancing, having legitimacy issues with outside stakeholders, and facing relatively high organizational and
administrative costs (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The liabilities of newness and smallness suggest that startups may beneﬁt less
from innovativeness. The youngest and smallest ﬁrms are also more exposed to the failure of a research or development project
than larger and more mature ﬁrms because such failure is more likely to endanger the entire existence of the ﬁrm (Nohria and
Gulati, 1996).
As Samuelsson and Davidsson (2009) note, the process of new venture creation differs between innovative and imitative new
ventures. Pursuing innovativeness appears to lead to riskier, more complicated, and less linear start-up processes. Amason et al.
(2006) further note that a novel entrantmust contendwith being both new and different. Such an entrant must bemanagedwithout
the beneﬁt of precedent. These characteristics of a new venture increase the skills, abilities, and the quality of composition required of
its topmanagement. Thus, pursuing innovations at the startup phase, i.e., launching an innovative and novel venture, involves greater
uncertainty and complexity, both of which point toward a lower probability of survival. Saemundsson and Dahlstrand (2005) lend
support to this observation by showing that ﬁrms that seek to exploit new, as opposed to existing, market knowledge are less likely
to grow.
4.1.2. Innovativeness and the overall risk proﬁle of startups
There are a number of additional theoretical reasons why innovativeness of startups may inﬂate their risk proﬁle and reduce the
likelihood of their survival.
First, innovating startups accumulate fewer tangible assets and thus have limited collateral to pledge as part of a lending process
(Brown et al., 2012; Minetti, 2011). This lack of collateral restricts their access to external ﬁnancing and impacts their ability to with-
stand negative revenue shocks, as a consequence. Second, innovativeness changes the overall risk proﬁle of a new venture bymaking
the distribution of revenue streamsmore variable and skewed (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000). Third, the R&D portfolios of new ventures
are typically undiversiﬁed (i.e., they run a limited number of costly projects at any given time; see Caggese, 2012; García-Quevedo
et al., 2014). Thus, the innovative new ventures may carry a non-negligible amount of idiosyncratic risks such that the failure of a
single project can threaten the existence of the entire venture. Fourth, innovativeness may also alter the intertemporal patterns of
cash ﬂows. Investments in innovativeness are frequently associated with long and uncertain payback times (Brown et al., 2012;
Minetti, 2011), which further reduces the likelihood of the ﬁrm being able to meet its debt and other payment obligations. Finally,
entrepreneurs who believe that they are exceptionally innovative may have a particular exit strategy in mind (e.g., DeTienne et al.,
2015) and can, as a result, seek to increase their ﬁrm's risk proﬁle to achieve the desired exit and associated rewards (conditioned
on survival, of course).
On the basis of the foregoing theoretical arguments, we set forth two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Innovativeness is negatively correlatedwith the survival probability of ﬁrms in the early phases of their development.
Hypothesis 1b. Innovativeness is positively correlatedwith the survival probability of ﬁrms in the early phases of their development.
It is important to note that Hypothesis 1a is fully consistentwith rational investment behavior and, in particular, with the standard
view in ﬁnance (Brealey et al., 2013) that investing in a high-risk activity goes hand-in-hand with higher expected returns. The
standard risk-return tradeoff is in line with a negative association between innovativeness and startup survival, if the expected prof-
itability of the investments in innovativeness is sufﬁciently high, conditional on ﬁrm survival.
4.2. The riskiness of innovativeness and entrepreneurial risk-taking
Utilizing entrepreneurs' personality traits as predictors for and determinants of entrepreneurial activity and success has long been
controversial in entrepreneurship research. Using this observation as their starting point, Rauch and Frese (2007) perform a meta-
analysis of how entrepreneurs' personality traits are associated with venture creation and success. Although the sizes of the effects
vary, these authors ﬁnd that some of the personality traits are signiﬁcantly correlated with successful entrepreneurial outcomes
and conclude that “…entrepreneurship research cannot develop a consistent theory about entrepreneurship if it does not take person-
ality variables into account…” (p. 375). More speciﬁcally, Rauch and Frese (2007) argue for theory-driven matching of personality
traits with speciﬁc entrepreneurial tasks and suggest that the importance of an entrepreneurial trait is task dependent.3 For example, Reid and Smith (2000) ﬁnd that innovativeness does not improve performance in their sample of Scottish startups. The startups in this studywere, on
average, 20 months old and had 6.4 employees immediately aftermarket entry. Reid and Smith'smeasure of innovation is based on a question that asks the respondent
to rate his/her ﬁrm's innovativeness by the following scale: “Not applicable”, “Could be better”, “Fair”, and “Good”.
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Kihlström and Roth, 1982; Knight, 1921), we argue that an entrepreneur's willingness to take and tolerate risk and uncertainty is a
particularly relevant and salient trait for understanding how the pursuit of innovations is related to ﬁrm survival during the early
phases of ﬁrm development. Entrepreneurs with a greater appetite for risk are more likely to pursue innovations that are risky ex
ante (Forlani andMullins, 2000). It is unclear, however, whether pursuing riskier innovationsmake the relation between innovative-
ness and ﬁrm survival more positive or more negative. On the one hand, the recent literature suggests, at least indirectly, that the
probability of ﬁrm survival decreases with the riskiness of the innovations pursued (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010). This prediction
suggests that if innovativeness is, on average, negatively associated with survival, the risk tolerance trait may further magnify the
negative association, which is consistent with “innovative strategy bets” not paying off in an uncertain environment. On the other
hand, Pérez-Luño et al. (2011) argue that the ventures of more risk-taking entrepreneurs are likely to generate more numerous
and novel innovations. If the innovativeness–survival link is positive on average to begin with, risk tolerance may strengthen this
association.
We summarize the above considerations as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The association between the innovativeness of startups and their probability of survival is more pronounced for more
risk-tolerant entrepreneurs.
5. Data and descriptive statistics
5.1. Data sources
Our data combine two random samples of new Finnish startups. The samples come from two surveys; at the time of the surveys,
the ﬁrms had only recently begun operations. The surveys were based on computer-aided telephone interviews of the startups'
owner-managers.
The ﬁrst survey targeted ﬁrms established in October 2003 and yielded 385 usable observations with a response rate of 45%
(documented in detail by Rouvinen and Ylä-Anttila, 2004). In this survey, approximately four months had elapsed since the startups
had become active. The second survey targeted ﬁrms that were established in the ﬁrst half of 2005 and yielded 780 usable observa-
tions, with a response rate of 41% (documented in detail by Pajarinen et al., 2006). In this survey, approximately six months had
passed since the startups had become active. The stratiﬁcation in the second survey oversampled limited liability companies, but
this oversampling is taken into account in our analysis. We also control for differences in macroeconomic conditions at the times of
the two surveys.
In both surveys, the most commonly reported reason for declining the request to be interviewed was lack of time. These non-
responses do not appear to be correlated with observable individual and ﬁrm characteristics. 4
In total, we have data on 1165 startups. The two surveys allow us to observe a number of characteristics of both entrepreneurs and
their ﬁrms (startups) at the time of market entry and to study how they are related to the subsequent survival of the startups.
The startups in our sample had survived their ﬁrst few months of active operation before they were surveyed. The subsequent
survival of the sample ﬁrms is determined on the basis of the ofﬁcial business register of Statistics Finland (the central statistical
agency), which covers all active enterprises, corporations, and self-employed persons in Finland. Because Statistics Finland tracks
business establishments separately from the business entities they belong to at any given point in time, we can quite conclusively
exclude business exits that result from mergers and acquisitions (i.e., the disappearance of a startup from our data due to a merger
or an acquisition; for the importance of taking such mergers and acquisitions activity into account, see Ceﬁs and Marsili, 2012;
Wennberg et al., 2010). That is, we can use establishment level data to checkwhether the establishments of the startups (that appear
to have exited) have, for example, been acquired by another ﬁrm. This check revealed that in our data, only nine business exits are
associated with mergers and acquisitions. Our results are unaffected, if we remove these potentially positive exits (e.g., harvest
sales; seeWennberg et al., 2010) from the data. Furthermore, as Coad (2014) notes, most exits indicate that the business in question
was unsuccessful.
5.2. Variables
Ourdependent variable, the three-year survival rate of a startup (Firm: Survives), takes on the value of one if the startup remains in
business three years after its entry and is zero otherwise (cf. Table 2).
Our key independent variable, Firm: Innovates, takes the value of one (and zero otherwise), if any of the following conditions are
true about theﬁrm in question at the time ofmarket entry: (i) it plans to employnew-to-the-market processes in the next three years;
(ii) it plans to introduce new-to-the-market products/services in the next three years; and/or (iii) it is actively pursuing innovations.4 In the combined sample, the survey response rate is slightly over 40%. Although comparatively high, this response rate might lead to the concern of a selection bias
related to startup survival. We cannot completely rule out such selection, but we note the following. First, in the descriptive statistics section, we show that the key
properties of our sample closely correspond to the relevant population, particular in terms of survival. Second, since the startups were surveyed when they were only
a few months old, this bias should not be large when compared with many existing data sets, which mostly include mature and old ﬁrms. Moreover, if there is such
selection, it biases the analysis in a particular way: if innovativeness actually reduces the survival of ﬁrms and therefore decreases the likelihood that a ﬁrm is observed
in our estimating sample, an indicator of innovativeness, which is a key explanatory variable in our regressionmodel, is positively correlatedwith the error term in the
sample. The estimated effect of innovativeness on survival thus has a positive bias.
Table 2
Construction of the variables.
Variable Unit/range/values
Firm: Survives Remains in business three years after entry {0, 1}
Firm: Innovates Plans to become or is innovative (see text) {0, 1}
Basic: 1st survey The observation comes from the ﬁrst survey (see text) {0, 1}
Basic: Ltd A limited liability company (cf. stratiﬁcation; see text) {0, 1}
Firm: Entry size Headcount of initial employment (in tens of persons) Count
Firm: Team More than one founder/entrepreneur involved {0, 1}
Firm: B-to-B Targets business-to-business markets {0, 1}
Firm: Not local Plans to earn revenues outside 50 km radius {0, 1}
Firm: Network Networking intensity (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1) [0–1]a
Firm: Growth intent Is actively seeking opportunities to grow {0, 1}b
Firm: Entry support Received public subsidies for establishing the ﬁrm {0, 1}
Firm: Other support Received public subsidies for running the ﬁrm {0, 1}
Firm: Region 5 categories: (omitted category: Helsinki region) {0, 1}c
Firm: Industry 8 categories: (omitted category: other services) {0, 1}d
Person: Age Age of the entrepreneur (in tens of years) Count
Person: Female The entrepreneur is a female {0, 1}
Person: Income Prior monthly gross income (in thousands of euros) Euros
Person: Higher ed. Has a higher education degree {0, 1}
Person: Industry exp. Has prior experience in the startup's industry {0, 1}
Person: Mgmt exp. Has prior management experience {0, 1}
Person: Spin-off Business idea relates to previous (paid) employment {0, 1}
Risk: Subjective exit Self-assessed subjective failure rate at the time of entry [0–1]e
Risk: Industry exit 3-year failure rate of young ﬁrms (the same 3-digit ind.) [0–1]f
Risk: Risk preference Has a preference for taking risks (0, 0.33, 0.67, 1) [0–1]g
a Count of third-party cooperation agreements in the following domains: production, sales and marketing, logistics, and R&D (divided by four).
b An afﬁrmative answer to a series of questions regarding growth prospects.
c South (excluding the Helsinki metropolitan region, the reference), West, East, and North.
d Industries (with NACE Rev. 1 codes): primary production (01–14, 40–41), technology industries (29–34, 352, 353), other manufacturing (15–37, excluding tech-
nology industries), construction (45), trade (50–52), accommodation and restaurants (55), transport (60–63), other services (64–99).
e Self-assessment of the startup's three-year exit rate.
f Actual three-year exit rate in the ﬁrm's three-digit industry.
g Survey question: “I am willing to take a lot of risk to get large revenue or income” with responses on a four-point scale from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”.
Rescaled to 0–1.
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indicates that this set captures an underlying one-dimensional latent construct rather well. Second, our measure necessarily departs
frommuch of the previous literature, because we want to use an ex ante measure of heterogeneous innovativeness that is capable of
capturing the uncertain nature of innovativeness (and not the ex post outcomes associated with it; see also the discussion in the next
section) and that also might not be associated with formal R&D.5 Third, to the extent that startups' plans are not fully followed, our
measure errs on the conservative side because it is not likely to predict exits.
As Table 2 shows, our control variables are grouped in four blocks. The ﬁrst block, Basic, consists of one binary indicator for limited
liability companies (Basic: Ltd) and of another binary indicator that identiﬁes the observations that come from the ﬁrst survey (Basic:
1st survey). The limited liability company indicator is a control for the organizational form of ﬁrms and also for oversampling in the
second survey. The latter indicator is a control for the differences in the two surveys and for the general macroeconomic conditions
between the two startup cohorts.
The next two blocks, Firm and Person, refer to the characteristics of the startups and their entrepreneurs (owner-managers). The
variables in these two blocks are mostly drawn from the prior literature; see, e.g., Parker (2009, Table 14.1), Song et al. (2008), and
Boyer and Blazy (2013). The overviews of these authors are not in complete concordance in all dimensions, but they suggest that
i) venture's survival prospects are enhanced by the entrepreneur's age (Person: Age) and education (Person: Higher Ed.) in addition
to his/her prior experience in the industry (Person: Industry exp., Person: Spin-off) and in management (Person: Mgmt exp.); that
ii) the gender of an entrepreneur matters for survival prospects (Person: Female); and iii) that the survival prospects of a venture
are enhanced by its entry size (Firm: Entry size), founding team size (Firm: Team), early growth (Firm: Growth intent), target market
size (Firm: Not local), and when it operates in service industries (Firm: Industry). Our review of the prior empirical literature
(e.g., Boyer and Blazy, 2013; Parker, 2009) also suggests that one should have controls for the geographical location (Firm: Region)
and for the degree of engagement in external networking (Firm: Network). Moreover, since any subsidized transfer eases a ﬁrm's
ﬁnancial position and thus its survival prospects, we control for receiving public support upon entry (Firm: Entry support) and
when running the business (Firm: Other support).5 Most small startups do not engage in formal R&D, so even this widely usedmeasure would be deﬁcient for our purposes. The innovativeness measure of Boyer and
Blazy (2013) is similar in spirit to ours, but we cannot determine from their wordingwhether it ismore of an ex ante than an ex post measure. It, too, appears to consist
of three parts.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
Firm: Survives 1165 .61 .49 0 1
Firm: Innovates 1165 .34 .47 0 1
Basic: 1st survey 1165 .33 .47 0 1
Basic: Ltd 1165 .29 .45 0 1
Firm: Entry size 1165 .22 .40 0 9
Firm: Team 1165 .21 .41 0 1
Firm: B-to-B 1165 .46 .50 0 1
Firm: Not local 1165 .57 .50 0 1
Firm: Network 1165 .28 .31 0 1
Firm: Growth intent 1165 .38 .49 0 1
Firm: Entry support 1165 .24 .43 0 1
Firm: Other support 1165 .24 .43 0 1
Firm: Region: South 1165 .22 .41 0 1
Firm: Region: West 1165 .35 .48 0 1
Firm: Region: East 1165 .09 .29 0 1
Firm: Region: North 1165 .12 .33 0 1
Firm: Ind. Primary 1165 .04 .19 0 1
Firm: Ind. Engineering 1165 .01 .11 0 1
Firm: Ind. Other manuf. 1165 .05 .23 0 1
Firm: Ind. KIBS 1165 .18 .38 0 1
Firm: Ind. Constr. 1165 .15 .35 0 1
Firm: Ind. Trade 1165 .24 .43 0 1
Firm: Ind. Rest. & Hotels 1165 .04 .20 0 1
Firm: Ind. Transport 1165 .05 .21 0 1
Person: Age 1165 3.69 1.03 1.80 6.90
Person: Female 1165 .34 .47 0 1
Person: Income 1165 2.21 1.71 0 25.00
Person: Higher ed. 1165 .46 .50 0 1
Person: Industry exp. 1165 .76 .43 0 1
Person: Mgmt exp. 1165 .48 .50 0 1
Person: Spin-off 1165 .12 .33 0 1
Risk: Subjective exit 1165 .11 .16 0 1
Risk: Industry exit 1165 .35 .09 0 1
Risk: Risk preference 1165 .47 .31 0 1
571A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581The remaining block, Risk, at the bottom of Table 2 refers to various risk measures (Risk: Subjective exit; Risk: Industry exit,
calculated on the basis of Statistics Finland's business registry; Risk: Risk preference). Based on the prior work (e.g., Caggese, 2012;
Cucculelli and Ermini, 2013; Forlani and Mullins, 2000; Kessler et al., 2012; Kihlström and Roth, 1982), we argue that not controlling
for the basic level of the startup's (Risk: Subjective exit) and its industry's risk (Risk: Industry exit) might lead to a biased effect of
innovativeness on survival. The reason is that pursuing innovations may be positively correlated with the overall (baseline) risk
proﬁle of the startup and that riskier ventures may be more likely to fail. In addition to controlling for the risk proﬁle of the startups,
these variables (Risk: Subjective exit; Risk: Industry exit) also (indirectly) control for entrepreneurial over-optimism (for a recent
summary of this behavioral bias, see Åstebro et al., 2014): A linear combination of the industry failure rate and an entrepreneur's
self-assessment of his venture's failure likelihood can be considered a measure of entrepreneurial optimism (Landier and Thesmar,
2009). A control for “self-report bias” is required, if the entrepreneurs who are overly optimistic are more likely to report that their
ﬁrms are engaged in pursuing innovations: In particular, if the entrepreneurs who are overly optimistic are actually more likely to
fail, a negative (downwards) bias might follow.6
5.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports a set of basic descriptive statistics for our sample. The ﬁrst line of the table shows that the three-year survival rate
of the sample ﬁrms is 61% (Firm: Survives). Eurostat's Business Demography by Size Class statistics states that the EU-15 average
percentage of enterprises that were newly born in 2005 and survived to 2008 is 63%; the ﬁgure for Finland is also 63%. Our sample
is thus representative of the survival pattern of a typical startup cohort.
The second line in Table 3 suggests that 34% of the sample ﬁrms are engaged in innovativeness (Firm: Innovates). According to the
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) conducted by Statistics Finland, 48% of all Finnish ﬁrmswith at least ten employees innovated in
2006–2008 (http://v.gd/jdpTS5). The difference in the corresponding share in our sample is attributable to two factors. First, CIS refers6 More generally, the direction of the ensuing bias is ambiguous: If the entrepreneurs who are overly optimistic are willing to invest more resources and put more
effort into their ﬁrms, it is plausible that their ﬁrms are actually less likely to fail, which would result in an upward bias and reduce the chances that we would obtain
a negative coefﬁcient.
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a large ﬁrm is more likely to have more divisions and establishments than a startup, it is more likely to report being engaged in
(at least one type of) innovativeness. Second, the basic deﬁnition of the CIS considers new-to-the-ﬁrm innovations. Because the
ﬁrms in our sample have recently been established, everything they do is new-to-the-ﬁrm and fulﬁls the basic deﬁnition of innovation
employed in the CIS. Thus, we necessarily employ a somewhat stricter new-to-the-market deﬁnition of innovation.
Table 3 also shows that one quarter of the startups received some formof public support upon entry (Firm: Entry support) and that
approximately the same share, albeit not necessarily the same ﬁrms, received public support when the business was already running
(Firm: Other support). Moreover, a typical startup in the sample is engaged in one type of external networking (Firm: Network). The
startups are small at the time of market entry, at which point they have 2.2 employees on average (Firm: Entry size, measured in tens
of persons). Obviously, many of these ﬁrms grew larger over time.
The average age of the entrepreneur is 36.9 years (Person: Age, measured in tens of years in the table), but it varies substantially
between 18 and 69. The average monthly income in prior employment was 2211 euros (Person: Income), which corresponds almost
exactly to the average income of Finns in the labor force.
On average, the observed three-year exit rate in the population of young ﬁrms in the same three-digit industries of the sample
ﬁrms is 35% (Risk: Industry exit). Upon entry, entrepreneurs are optimistic with respect to their own prospects: the average self-
assessed survival rate of one's own startup is 89% (Risk: Subjective exit). The entrepreneurs are, on average, almost risk neutral
when measured by our indicator for their risk appetite (Risk: Preference).
6. Method
6.1. Empirical approach
Our dependent variable, Firm: Survives, is binary and refers to the three-year survival of the startups. We therefore study the
survival likelihood using a standard probit model (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
The metric of main interest to us is the economic and statistical signiﬁcance of the average marginal effect of the Firm: Innovates
variable on the probability of startup survival. We add our control variables block-by-block (as deﬁned in Table 2) to show that our
estimates are not sensitive to how the control variables are entered into themodel. These baselinemodels allowus to explorewhether
Hypothesis 1a or 1b is supported by the data. To test Hypothesis 2, we augment our baseline model with an interaction term of Risk:
Risk Preference and Firm: Innovates. The coefﬁcient of this variable describes how the effect of innovativeness on startup survival
varies with entrepreneurs' risk tolerance.
6.2. Measurement issues
As we argued already earlier, it is important that the empirical approach used to study the relation between innovativeness and
ﬁrm survival takes into account two interrelated but separate selection biases. We discuss each of them in turn:
6.2.1. Survivorship bias of ﬁrms
There is a survivorship bias with respect to ﬁrms if the estimating sample only includes incumbent businesses that are a selected
subset of ﬁrms that originally entered the market.
The following hypothetical example illustrates how andwhy the survivorship bias of ﬁrmsmay lead to a spurious positive relation
between innovativeness and survival: First, assume that innovativeness reduces survival and that ﬁrms may have a set of other
strengths that enhance their survival. For simplicity, the strengths are by assumption uncorrelated with innovation activity in the
population of new ﬁrms. Second, note that to be included in the (selected) sample of surviving ﬁrms, a surviving innovative ﬁrm is
more likely to have higher levels of these sets of strengths than its non-innovative counterparts. Third, the strengths are likely to be
partly unobserved by an empirical researcher and therefore show up in the error term of a typical survival regression. Fourth, because
the error term and innovativeness are positively correlated when the regression is ﬁtted to the sample of surviving ﬁrms, there is a
positive bias (see the formula for omitted variable bias in, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 93).7 If the bias is large enough, the
estimated regression coefﬁcient may be positive, although innovativeness is assumed to reduce survival prospects.
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that there is a statistical reason to focus on a startup sample, like we do, when studying
the association between innovativeness and survival.
6.2.2. Survivorship bias of ideas
The survivorship bias of ideas emerges because developing a commercially successful innovation is best understood as a selection
process in which the choice to continue (or discontinue) is made at each step. Being engaged in innovativeness or investing more in-
puts into the innovation process does not ensure that a commercially successful innovation will ultimately result (e.g., Buddelmeyer7 This conclusion follows because the correlation between the included variable and the omitted variable is positive and because we have assumed, for purposes of
our hypothetical example, that the (unobserved) strengths increase the survival rate of ﬁrms. More generally, if a survival regression is ﬁtted on a selected sample, the
coefﬁcient of the variable that measures innovativeness may be biased upward or downward, depending on how it is correlatedwith the attritionmechanism that de-
termines which ﬁrms get selected into the sample.
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Fig. 1. Three-year survival rate by innovativeness. Notes: The vertical bars display themean of Firm: Survives, conditional onwhether they are (right, Firm: Innovates=
1) or they are not (left, Firm: Innovates = 0) pursuing innovations. The vertical lines on the top of each bar represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the means.
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how skillfully the process is executed and how technological, legal, and market uncertainties are managed and resolved during the
process (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Howell et al., 2005).
If an empirical measure of innovativeness is an ex post indicator, it tends to be biased toward innovators that are more likely to be
successful (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010). For example, owning a patent or a trademark does not guarantee success in the market place,
but it does indicate some level of success in past innovativeness. This reasoning indicates that the subset ofﬁrmswith innovations that
are identiﬁed by ex post indicators is more likely to survive than other ﬁrms.
In sum, the survival of ideas biases the assessment of how the decision to pursue innovativeness is related to ﬁrms' subsequent
survival. To capture the uncertainty of innovativeness and to allow for the more complex process of creating innovative ventures
(Samuelsson and Davidsson, 2009), one has to use a proper ex ante measure of innovativeness, such as our Firm: Innovates variable,
in the empirical analysis.7. Results
7.1. Main results
Fig. 1 takes a ﬁrst look at the association between the innovativeness of startups and their subsequent survival. The height of
the two vertical bars corresponds to the mean survival rates of startups, conditional on whether they are (right) or they are not
(left) engaged in innovativeness. A comparison of the two bars suggests that themean survival rate of startups engaged in innovative-
ness is 7–8 percentage points lower (mean: 56%) than themean survival rate of startups not engaged in innovativeness (mean: 63%).Table 4
Estimation results of the baseline probit models.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm: Innovates −0.074 ** −0.064 * −0.065 ** −0.068 **
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Basic: Included? Yes ** Yes * Yes * Yes **
Firm: Included? Yes *** Yes *** Yes **
Person: Included? Yes *** Yes ***
Risk: Included? Yes ***
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165
Pseudo R-squared .108 .149 .164 .186
Notes: The dependent variable is Firm: Survives. The reported numbers are themarginal effects of the probit estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses). The
control variable blocks included are indicated by “Yes”, and their joint signiﬁcance is illustrated by asterisks. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix A reports the complete estimation results.
Table 5
Interaction of innovativeness (Firm: Innovates) with risk preference (Risk: Preference).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm: Innovates 0.036 0.048 0.044 0.043
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Innovates × Risk pref. −0.238 ** −0.240 ** −0.235 ** −0.238 ***
(0.096) (0.094) (0.093) (0.091)
Risk: Risk preference 0.104 ** 0.093 * 0.098 ** 0.086 *
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Basic: Included? Yes *** Yes ** Yes ** Yes **
Firm: Included? Yes *** Yes *** Yes **
Person: Included? Yes *** Yes ***
Risk: Included? Yes ***
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.153 0.168 0.190
Notes: The dependent variable is Firm: Survives. The reported numbers are themarginal effects of the probit estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses). The
included control variable blocks are indicated by “Yes” and their joint signiﬁcance is illustrated by asterisks. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10%
levels, respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix A reports complete estimation results.
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(2013) report for the survival difference among innovative and non-innovative French startups.
Table 4 reports the marginal effects from our baseline probit models (the dependent variable is Firm: Survives). The ﬁrst row
in the table reports the marginal effect of Firm: Innovates and shows that the survival probability of ﬁrms pursuing innovations
is 6–7 percentage points lower than that of other ﬁrms. The effect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in three cases (and
at the 10% level in column 2) and is not sensitive to changing the set of control variables. These ﬁndings thus support
Hypothesis 1a.
The signs of the coefﬁcients of the control variables, which are not discussed in detail here (see the Appendix A for full results), are
consistent with the prior literature. They are also jointly signiﬁcant when tested block-by-block (Table 4).
In Table 5, we studyHypothesis 2 by adding the interaction of Risk: Risk Preferencewith Firm: innovates into ourmodels.With the
exception of the interaction term, Table 5 is identical to Table 4.
As Table 5 shows, the interaction term obtains a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. The interaction term is also jointly
signiﬁcant with Firm: innovates (see the Appendix A), which provides support for Hypothesis 2 and implies that the higher the
entrepreneur's appetite for risk, the more negative the association is between innovativeness and survival. This is consistent with
the prior view that there is task dependence, i.e., that there is a matching of the risk-tolerant personality trait with the speciﬁc entre-
preneurial task of running an innovative venture.
Fig. 2 depicts how an entrepreneur's risk appetitemoderates the effect of innovativeness on the probability of survival. The vertical
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Fig. 2. Conditional survival probabilities. Notes: The ﬁgure is simulated using the estimation results reported in Table 5. The vertical lines indicate 95% conﬁdence
intervals and the white (horizontal) lines represent the mean estimates.
575A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581(left) to completely risk tolerant (right). The ﬁgure uses the estimates of Table 5; when drawing the graph, the values of the control
variables are set to theirmean values. The vertical lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals and thewhite solid line represents themean
predictions. The purpose of Fig. 2 is to illustrate the joint effect of the ﬁrst three coefﬁcients in Column 4 of Table 5 (when accounting
for the presence of all the other variables).
Fig. 2 shows that the survival probability of ﬁrms pursuing innovations is much lower than that of other ﬁrms, particular when the
entrepreneur has an appetite for risk. Thus, consistentwithHypothesis 2, it appears that the interaction of innovativeness and the risk
appetite of a startup reduces the probability of survival. This ﬁnding suggests that there is a matching of the personality trait of being
risk tolerant with the speciﬁc entrepreneurial task of running a highly innovative venture. This matching seems to lead to exit-
proneness: when evaluated at the highest risk preference, the difference in the survival probability between the innovative and
non-innovative startups is as high as 24 percentage points.
7.2. Robustness tests and auxiliary analyses
We start by demonstrating that the survivorship of ideas is an important ingredient in our results by using an ex post measure of
innovativeness instead of our preferred ex antemeasure. The ex postmeasure is deﬁned as a binary indicator that is equal to one if the
startup owns patents, trademarks, or intangible assets and equal to zero otherwise. A startup reporting that it owns intellectual assets
of this type indicates that it has enjoyed at least some prior success in innovativeness. When we replace our preferred measure with
the ex post measure and re-estimate the probit models of Table 4, we obtain a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. This
ﬁnding is consistent with the view that when the measure of innovativeness is biased toward successful innovators, a spurious
positive association may be found.
Notably, when we add the two measures simultaneously into the probit models of Table 4, we obtain a negative (−0.071) and
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value= 0.029)marginal effect for our preferred ex antemeasure. The ex postmeasure obtains, again, a pos-
itive and insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. These differences between the ex ante and ex post measures lend additional support to our
argument that properly accounting for the uncertainty in pursuing innovations is important.
We have explored the robustness of our baseline results also in the following ways: First, it might be argued that our focus on
survival probability is inadequate. We can, however, show that this is not the case. We use the employment of startups three
years after entry as an alternative outcome variable. For those ﬁrms that have exited, employment is set to zero. The tobit
estimations of the speciﬁcations that match those of Tables 4 and 5 conﬁrm our basic ﬁndings. For example, we ﬁnd that in the
model using the longest control vector (cf. the far right column in Table 4), the marginal effect of the innovativeness on the prob-
ability of the ﬁrm having positive employment is −0.054, which is just shy of being statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(p-value = 0.053).
Second, our baseline estimations employ a three-year survival rate as the dependent variable. The use of this particular time
window is consistent with the time frame of our ex ante innovation measure. However, at the suggestion of an anonymous ref-
eree, we also consider the two-, four-, and ﬁve-year survival rates as the dependent variable. Our results in Table 4 are robust to
using the two-year survival rate as the dependent variable. In particular, we found that the coefﬁcient of Firm: Innovates is
−0.086 (p-value = 0.006) in the estimation, which is similar to Table 4, Column 4. For the longer survival rates, the coefﬁcients
of Firm: Innovates are also negative, but the effects are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. For instance, when
using the four-year survival period, the coefﬁcient of Firm: Innovates is−0.048 (p-value = 0.150) in the speciﬁcation similar
to Table 4, Column 4. It thus seems that uncertainty regarding innovativeness is mostly resolved by the third year. After that,
a startup's engagement in innovativeness appears to be less informative of its likelihood to survive. The results of Table 5 are
not affected, if the time window for survival is changed: in all cases, the interaction term between a startup's innovativeness
and an entrepreneur's risk preference is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The interaction term is also jointly signiﬁcant
with Firm: Innovates in all the estimations. For example, when using the ﬁve-year survival rate as the dependent variable (sim-
ilar to Table 5 column 4), the coefﬁcient of the interaction term is−0.296 (p-value 0.002). A χ2 test for the joint signiﬁcance of
the interaction term and Firm: Innovates obtains the value of 11.001 (p-value 0.004).
Third, we re-ran the models reported in Tables 4 and 5 as a logit model and as a linear probability model (OLS). The
results echo our baseline ﬁndings. For example, using the model that is reported in Column 4 of Table 4, the marginal ef-
fect of Firm: Innovates in a logit model is negative and signiﬁcant (−0.066, p-value 0.046), and in an OLS model, negative
and almost signiﬁcant at the 5% level (−0.065, p-value 0.053). Using the model that is reported in Column 4 of Table 5,
the marginal effect of the interaction term is −0.250 (p-value 0.008) in a logit model and −0.248 (p-value 0.007) in
an OLS model.
Fourth, the potential endogeneity of innovativeness ought to be considered. To this end, we need a valid instrumental vari-
able (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) that is not directly related to ﬁrm survival and that explains why certain startups are engaged
in innovativeness. Unfortunately, there are no perfect instruments in our data. To address the endogeneity concern, we use trav-
el distance to the nearest Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment as an instrument in an exploratory
fashion. There are 15 such centers in Finland. These centers provide public support to Finnish small and medium-sized ﬁrms
(e.g., to their various development projects). They also act as local outlets for the services of the Finnish Funding Agency for
Technology and Innovation (Tekes), which provides public subsidies for pursuing innovations. Our motivation to use the travel
distance as an instrument is that the closer to a center a ﬁrm is located, the more likely it is to seek and/or to obtain public sup-
port for pursuing innovations. The instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction if, conditional on the startups' industry and re-
gion (and our other controls), the distance to a center has no direct effect on their survival. The ﬁrst stage results suggest that the
576 A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581instrument has some predictive power.8 When we use the standard 2SLS estimation and the distance as an instrument, we ob-
tain a (large) negative but insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient for Firm: Innovates. This result is qualitatively consistent with our basic ﬁnd-
ings: the coefﬁcient is not estimated accurately, which is not surprising because the instrument is far from perfect. Our
experiments with other instruments, such as the squared travel distance as an additional instrument or the travel time to the
nearest center as the sole instrument, yielded similar results.
8. Discussion and conclusions
8.1. Summary and discussion
There are a number of competing theoretical arguments that explain why the relation between startups' innovativeness and
their subsequent survival might be either positive or negative. On the one hand, innovativeness can increase the likelihood of
survival if it enhances startups' market power, reduces the costs of production, or allows the creation of dynamic capabilities
and absorptive capacity (Teece et al., 1997; Zahra and George, 2002). Younger ﬁrms may beneﬁt disproportionately from the
opportunities created by innovativeness due to their less rigid routines and greater ﬂexibility (e.g., Brüderl and Schüssler,
1990; Christensen and Bower, 1996; Freeman et al., 1983; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Klepper and Simons, 1997; Lumpkin
and Dess, 1996). On the other hand, we have argued that the stage of ﬁrm development and the stage and nature of innovativeness
may moderate the association between innovativeness and ﬁrm survival adversely and can even turn it negative. An innovative
startup is laden with excess liability of novelty and smallness, which reduce its chances of survival relative to its non-innovative
counterparts. Startups' innovativenessmay also limit their access to external ﬁnance (due to lack of collateral) and change their over-
all risk proﬁle bymaking the distribution of revenue streamsmore variable and skewed (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000) and by delaying
them in time.
Whereas the available empirical literature mostly suggests that the relation between ﬁrms' innovativeness and their subsequent
survival is positive, we ﬁnd a negative association between innovativeness and survival. Our baseline estimations suggest that the
survival probability of startups engaged in innovativeness is approximately 6–7 percentage points lower than that of other startups.
This ﬁnding reinforces the result of Boyer and Blazy (2013), who documented that innovative Frenchmicro-enterprises established in
1998 were more likely to fail than their non-innovative counterparts.
In our view, two aspects of our empirical approach are important for these ﬁndings: First, we employ an ex ante measure of inno-
vativeness to account for the associated uncertainties and to avoid the survivorship bias of ideas (i.e., the consequences of focusing on
a selected subset of ﬁrms that have previously innovated successfully). Second, we study the association between innovativeness and
ﬁrm survival using a sample of startups, which allows us to account for the survivorship bias of ﬁrms (i.e., the consequences ofmarket
selection) to a reasonable extent.
We also ﬁnd that the interaction of innovativeness and entrepreneurs' higher appetite for risk further reduces the survival pros-
pects of their startups. This ﬁnding is consistent with Buddelmeyer et al. (2010), who suggest that the probability of survival may
vary with the riskiness of innovations. It is also consistent with Forlani and Mullins (2000), who argue that more risk-tolerant entre-
preneurs are more likely to engage their startups in riskier innovative efforts. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the effect
of entrepreneurial risk-taking is task dependent and that it matters in particular for innovativeness. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the broader conclusions of Rauch and Frese (2007), who stress that it is important to link entrepreneurs' traits to particular entrepre-
neurial tasks.
8.2. Limitations and further research
A limitation of our study is thatwe cannot explicitly address the variousmodes of exits and their potentially different determinants
(Bates, 2005). Exits via mergers and acquisitions, including what Wennberg et al. (2010) call harvest and distress sales, appear to
be rare in our data during the time horizon that it covers. Therefore, we could not analyze them statistically. However, analyzing
how (ex ante) innovativeness is associated with various forms of exit, such as in a competing risks framework, would certainly be
valuable because it might reveal further heterogeneity in how engaging in innovativeness is associated with longer-term survival.
Our analysis does not rule out the possibility that innovativeness will be positively associated with, for example, the likelihood of
trade sales over the longer term.
Another limitation is theﬂipside of our strength: our data are not informative regarding incumbents' innovativeness and regarding
how associated, frequently incremental, improvements shape incumbents' subsequent survival (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995).
Our study highlights the importance of (a) allowing for selection among and within the various cohorts of ﬁrms (Cader and
Leatherman, 2011; Coad et al., 2013), and (b) distinguishing ex ante activity from ex post outcomes, such as patents and market
introductions of new processes or products.8 The coefﬁcient of travel distance (measured in kilometers) in the ﬁrst-stage regressionwas−0.0007 (p-value 0.075). The sign is as expected, but the statistical sig-
niﬁcance is relatively weak. The adjusted R2 of the ﬁrst-stage regression was 0.303 and partial R2 of travel distance was 0.003.
577A. Hyytinen et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 30 (2015) 564–581Although we believe that our measure of innovativeness is an improvement over those used in the previous litera-
ture, our measure still leaves something to be desired: we could not directly observe the nature and riskiness of
startups' innovations. Measuring innovativeness in general (Buddelmeyer et al., 2010) and, e.g., the potential market
newness of entering ﬁrms (Dahlqvist and Wiklund, 2012) is difﬁcult. This proposition indicates that our measure is like-
ly to hide much interesting heterogeneity. The effect of innovativeness on startup survival may also depend on industry
characteristics, such as the technological and market environment (we do control for industry but do not explicitly
study industry characteristics). Whether different types of innovativeness among startups are differentially associated
with subsequent survival—and how those effects are context dependent—remain open questions that future research
might fruitfully address.
Three ﬁnal limitations are worth mentioning. First, the ﬁrms in our sample were surveyed when they were a few
months old. The survivorship bias of ﬁrms should therefore be reasonably small, but clearly it is not eliminated altogether.
Second, although we have controlled for the industry failure rate and an entrepreneur's self-assessment of his venture's
likelihood of failure, we cannot completely dismiss a type of self-report bias due to more optimistic entrepreneurs
being more likely to report that their ﬁrms are pursuing innovations.9 Finally, it is important to acknowledge that innova-
tiveness, even if measured ex ante and studied using a random sample of startups, is not randomly allocated. Our analysis
might suffer from a negative bias (i.e., we might obtain too negative of a coefﬁcient) if, for example, the startups of tech-
nologically oriented and technically skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to pursue innovations and if such orientations
and skills have a negative effect on the likelihood of startup survival. We are the ﬁrst to admit that our data do not
allow us to conclusively rule out such self-selection, although our extensive set of control variables alleviates this concern.8.3. Managerial and policy implications
An obvious managerial implication of our ﬁndings is that innovativeness should not be considered a form of inexpensive
insurance against failure during the early phases of ﬁrm development: if survival is one of the primary objectives of an entrepre-
neur and, in particular, if entrepreneurs have overly concentrated portfolios (i.e., if they carry signiﬁcant idiosyncratic business
risk; Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), it may be best not to try to be innovative or to engage
in only modestly risky forms of such activity. Successful radical innovation may still be rewarded handsomely; seeking such
rewards, however, comes with a cost.
Our ﬁndings also have implications from a wider public policy perspective. First, besides its primary productivity, spillover,
and competitiveness motives, public support for innovativeness is sometimes based on the premise that innovating ﬁrms are
more likely to survive and are thus more likely to create stable jobs. Our analysis casts doubt on this particular premise, even
if the other motives for public support remain intact. Second, discontinuing a business does not necessarily indicate that all
fruits of its innovative efforts are wasted. On the one hand, innovativeness may generate local knowledge spillovers (see,
e.g., Gilbert et al., 2004, and the references therein), regardless of whether such activities are ultimately successful. The knowl-
edge spillover theory of entrepreneurship predicts, for example, that new knowledge created by incumbent ﬁrms leads to new
market entry (Acs et al., 2009; Plummer and Acs, 2014). On the other hand, exits of startups that have pursued innovations
release resources (e.g., employees with enhanced human capital and specialized assets) that may stimulate future entry
(Pe'er and Vertinsky, 2008). Viewed from this perspective, the most important argument for subsidizing startups' innovative-
ness is that they produce positive intertemporal and spatial externalities.
We conclude with two reminders. First, the documented negative association between startups' innovativeness and
the probability of survival does not imply that the survival rate of innovative startups is sub-optimal; our ﬁndings say
nothing about the socially optimal survival rate of innovative startups. Second, our ﬁndings do not exclude the possi-
bility that either the expected private or social returns are greater for innovative startups than for their non-innovative
counterparts.Acknowledgments
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Complete estimation results of the baseline probit model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm: Innovates −0.074 ** −0.064 * −0.065 ** −0.068 **
(0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Basic: 1st survey −0.168 *** −0.100 *** −0.136 *** −0.133 ***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039)
Basic: Ltd 0.326 *** 0.313 *** 0.290 *** 0.271 ***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036)
Firm: Entry size 0.137 0.125 0.115
(0.085) (0.081) (0.074)
Firm: Team −0.019 −0.015 −0.010
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040)
Firm: B-to-B 0.061 ** 0.046 0.049 *
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Firm: Not local −0.009 −0.011 −0.007
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Firm: Network −0.001 −0.011 −0.009
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Firm: Growth intent 0.009 0.007 0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Firm: Entry support 0.062 0.068 * 0.055
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Firm: Other support 0.104 *** 0.097 *** 0.099 ***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Firm: Region: South 0.019 0.026 0.009
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Firm: Region West 0.019 0.024 0.007
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Firm: Region: East 0.022 0.030 0.016
(0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Firm: Region: North 0.072 0.087 * 0.078 *
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Firm: Ind. Primary −0.014 −0.016 −0.059
(0.073) (0.070) (0.073)
Firm: Ind. Engineering 0.188 * 0.182 0.171
(0.110) (0.113) (0.104)
Firm: Ind. Other manuf. −0.100 −0.092 −0.082
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062)
Firm: Ind. KIBS −0.009 −0.026 0.007
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Firm: Ind. Constr. 0.160 *** 0.139 *** 0.112 **
(0.041) (0.044) (0.045)
Firm: Ind. Trade −0.015 0.001 0.052
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Firm: Ind. Rest. & Hotels 0.038 0.007 0.064
(0.069) (0.069) (0.066)
Firm: Ind. Transport 0.164 *** 0.159 *** 0.062
(0.061) (0.061) (0.072)
Person: Age 0.009 0.005
(0.014) (0.014)
Person: Female 0.012 0.011
(0.031) (0.031)
Person: Income 0.013 0.012
(0.010) (0.010)
Person: Higher ed. 0.006 0.013
(0.029) (0.028)
Person: Industry exp. 0.094 *** 0.079 **
(0.033) (0.032)
Person: Mgmt exp. 0.016 0.009
(0.031) (0.030)
Person: Spin-off 0.105 ** 0.099 **
(0.041) (0.041)
Risk: Subjective exit −0.350 ***
(0.080)
Risk: Industry exit −0.669 ***
(0.175)
Risk: Risk preference 0.017
(0.042)
Table A1 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wald test for rhs set 1 (χ2) 5.606 ** 3.571 * 3.791 * 4.261 **
Wald test for rhs set 2 (χ2) 51.772 *** 43.934 *** 35.883 **
Wald test for rhs set 3 (χ2) 23.754 *** 18.892 ***
Wald test for rhs set 4 (χ2) 35.65 ***
Pseudo R-squared 0.108 0.149 0.164 0.186
Log pseudolikelihood −695.350 −663.637 −651.840 −634.616
Wald (χ2) 143.585 *** 165.781 *** 191.037 *** 232.437 ***
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165
Notes: The dependent variable is Firm: Survives. The reported numbers are the marginal effects of the probit estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses).
***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A2
Complete estimation results: Interaction of innovativeness and risk preference included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm: Innovates 0.036 0.048 0.044 0.043
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Innovates × Risk pref. −0.238 ** −0.240 ** −0.235 ** −0.238 ***
(0.096) (0.094) (0.093) (0.091)
Risk: Risk preference 0.104 ** 0.093 * 0.098 ** 0.086 *
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Basic: 1st survey −0.171 *** −0.101 *** −0.137 *** −0.132 ***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.040) (0.039)
Basic: Ltd 0.329 *** 0.317 *** 0.293 *** 0.277 ***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
Firm: Entry size 0.128 0.118 0.108
(0.084) (0.081) (0.075)
Firm: Team −0.016 −0.012 −0.010
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040)
Firm: B-to-B 0.063 ** 0.047 0.050 *
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Firm: Not local −0.009 −0.011 −0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Firm: Network −0.008 −0.018 −0.014
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Firm: Growth intent 0.012 0.009 0.010
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Firm: Entry support 0.063 0.068 * 0.054
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Firm: Other support 0.103 *** 0.095 *** 0.099 ***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Firm: Region: South 0.019 0.025 0.010
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Firm: Region West 0.016 0.021 0.004
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Firm: Region: East 0.018 0.027 0.013
(0.052) (0.051) (0.049)
Firm: Region: North 0.071 0.087 * 0.079 *
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Firm: Ind. Primary −0.018 −0.020 −0.065
(0.073) (0.071) (0.073)
Firm: Ind. Engineering 0.199 * 0.193 * 0.182 *
(0.108) (0.111) (0.103)
Firm: Ind. Other manuf. −0.101 −0.093 −0.084
(0.063) (0.063) (0.061)
Firm: Ind. KIBS −0.006 −0.024 0.010
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Firm: Ind. Constr. 0.158 *** 0.137 *** 0.109 **
(0.041) (0.044) (0.045)
Firm: Ind. Trade −0.017 −0.002 0.051
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Firm: Ind. Rest. & Hotels 0.035 0.003 0.063
(0.070) (0.070) (0.067)
Firm: Ind. Transport 0.162 *** 0.158 ** 0.060
(0.061) (0.061) (0.073)
Person: Age 0.008 0.002
(0.015) (0.014)
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Person: Female 0.011 0.010
(0.031) (0.031)
Person: Income 0.013 0.012
(0.010) (0.010)
Person: Higher ed. 0.010 0.016
(0.029) (0.028)
Person: Industry exp. 0.095 *** 0.082 **
(0.033) (0.032)
Person: Mgmt exp. 0.015 0.009
(0.031) (0.030)
Person: Spin-off 0.104 ** 0.098 **
(0.041) (0.041)
Risk: Subjective exit −0.350 ***
(0.078)
Risk: Industry exit −0.684 ***
(0.176)
Wald test for rhs set 1 (χ2) 11.977 *** 10.286 ** 10.524 ** 11.180 **
Wald test for rhs set 2 (χ2) 51.508 *** 43.475 *** 35.921 **
Wald test for rhs set 3 (χ2) 23.714 *** 18.828 ***
Wald test for rhs set 4 (χ2) 35.961 ***
Wald test for Firm: Innovates and
Innovates × Risk pref. (χ2)
11.610 *** 10.010 *** 10.000 *** 11.030 ***
Pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.153 0.168 0.190
Log pseudolikelihood −691.865 −660.163 −648.346 −631.154
Wald (χ2) 145.335 *** 169.162 *** 194.701 *** 235.159 ***
Observations 1165 1165 1165 1165
Notes: The dependent variable is Firm: Survives. The reported numbers are the marginal effects of the probit estimates and their standard errors (in parentheses).
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